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ANNEXATIONS IN URBAN COUNTIES:
MISSOURI'S SCHEME AND A PLAN
FOR REFORM
STEVEN H. GOLDBERG*
I. INTRODUCTION
Annexation is the primary method municipalities use to extend their
boundaries.' Though the procedures often vary,2 the annexation pro-
* B.A., University of Rochester, 1980; J.D., Washington University, 1985.
1. Annexation generally is defined as: "the addition of territory to a municipal cor-
poration as an integral part; generally it involves joining all or part of the territory of an
unincorporated, less populous, or subordinate local unit to that of a larger unit, usually
incorporated, offering a more complete array of municipal services." NATIONAL
LEAGUE OF CITIES, ADJUSTING MUNICIPAL BOUNDARIES 1 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as NATIONAL LEAGUE]. See generally D. MANDELKER, D. NETSCH & P. SALSICH,
JR., STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 41-65 (1983) (for an
overall view of local government incorporation and annexation) [hereinafter cited as D.
MANDELKER]; Cotrell & Stevens, The 1975 Voting Rights Act, Annexation Policy and
Urban Growth in the Sunbelt, 3 URB. L. REV. 1-10 (1979) (tracing the history of annex-
ation in the United States).
Between 1950 and 1970, 171 of 177 southern and western municipalities having a
population of 50,000 or more made significant annexations. INTERNATIONAL CITY
MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, THE MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK 19 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as THE MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK].
2. Annexations have been classified into five key categories: 1) Legislative determi-
nation-in which special acts of the legislature make municipal boundary changes;
2) Popular determination-in which the people determine by election if a proposed mu-
nicipal boundary change will take place; 3) Municipal determination-in which a unit of
local government is authorized to extend its boundaries by unilateral action of its gov-
erning body; 4) Judicial determination-in which the courts determine if a proposed
boundary change shall take place; and 5) Quasi-legislative-in which an independent,
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cess provides a useful tool for promoting orderly growth.3 In develop-
ing metropolitan areas, annexations cause municipalities and county
governments to compete for the benefits of unincorporated territory.4
This competition between governmental entities creates conflict which
can lead to disorganization, inequitable and inefficient delivery of serv-
ices, poor planning, and inconsistent zoning.5
This Note focuses on the annexation process in Missouri's urban ar-
eas.6 First, the Note traces the history and development of annexation
nonjudicial tribunal determines whether a proposed annexation shall take place. See
SENGSTOCK, ANNEXATION: A SOLUTION TO THE METROPOLITAN AREA PROBLEM 9-
39 (1960) reproduced in NATIONAL LEAGUE, supra note 1, at 4. See also HORAN &
TAYLOR, EXPERIMENTS IN METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT (comparing alternative
methods of local government in metropolitan areas); Woodroof, Systems and Standards
of Municipal Annexation Review: A Comparative Analysis, 58 GEO. L.J. 743 (1970) (re-
viewing and comparing state annexation procedures and substantive standards); Report
ofAnnexation Committee, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MUNICIPAL LAW OFFICERS, 42A
MUN. L. REV. 22-31 (1979) (listing annexation methods found in particular states).
3. NATIONAL LEAGUE, supra note 1, at 1. NATIONAL LEAGUE notes six primary
reasons for advocating annexations in urban areas: I) a city needs a fringe area for
continued orderly growth and prosperity of the metropolitan area; 2) a city needs fringe
land to plan and provide public service facilities such as water and sewer systems, street
extensions, and recreational facilities on a rational and economic basis; 3) to bring the
fringe area within city land use controls; 4) to subject the fringe land to city protective
regulations and provide police and fire services; 5) to regulate and deliver health and
sanitation services to the fringe area; and 6) to ensure that residents of the fringe area
who benefit from many of the facilities provided by city government bear their full share
of these costs. Id. at 1-2. The central theme is that annexation can provide "a sound
base for areawide action, orderly growth, and essential government services." Id. at 2.
Some municipalities, however, attempt to annex land for less noble reasons, such as
increasing tax revenues by incorporating commercially valuable property or thwarting
anticipated annexations by another jurisdiction. See, e.g., Superior Oil Co. v. City of
Port Arthur, 628 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 802
(1982) (city attempted to annex three marine leagues extending into the Gulf of Mexico
which encompassed a drilling platform, five oil, gas and mineral leases and various
other production facilities). See also infra notes 64, 117 and accompanying text.
4. See Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the
Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643, 694-99 (1964). See also infra notes 47-48 and accompa-
nying text.
5. See infra notes 130-33 and accompanying text. See also Mandelker, Municipal
Incorporation and Annexation: Recent Legislative Trends, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 285, 298-99
(1960); Murphy, Intergovernmental Dynamics of Annexation and De-Annexation: The
Richmond Case, 31 AD. L. REV. 385, 394 (1979); Sandalow, supra note 4, at 694 (not-
ing three distinct interests directly affected by annexation: the municipality, the terri-
tory to be annexed and the larger area from which the municipality takes the territory).
6. The Missouri annexation process provides a good illustration of the procedures
and problems faced by other states with developing metropolitan areas. In 1983, there
existed 156 counties with populations greater than 250,000, including 48 counties with
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law in Missouri.' Second, it discusses the deficiencies in Missouri's
current annexation scheme and explores the potential impact of these
deficiencies on annexations in St. Louis County.' Finally, this Note
suggests alternatives to Missouri's present annexation process that will
promote orderly growth and reduce conflicts between urban counties
and municipalities seeking to annex unincorporated land.9
II. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF MISSOURI'S
ANNEXATION SCHEME
A. Statutory Framework" The Sawyer Act
The Sawyer Act is the cornerstone of Missouri's annexation
scheme. 10 Passage of the Act marked the legislature's first attempt to
impose stricter annexation requirements on municipalities wishing to
annex new territory." Prior to the Sawyer Act, a city had almost un-
more than 500,000 persons and 20 counties with one million or more. In 44 counties,
the core city and the county governments operate independently of each other. THE
MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK, supra note 1, at 13. Unlike other discussions of the annexa-
tion problem, this Note will not focus on annexations made by central cities, but con-
centrates on annexations in urban counties like St. Louis, that have a separate core city
and county governments. For a discussion from a traditional annexation perspective,
see Vestal, Government Fragmentation in Urban Areas, 43 U. COLO. L. REV. 155
(1971).
7. See infra notes 10-128 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 129-62 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 163-84 and accompanying text.
10. The Sawyer Act is the popular name used by courts to refer to § 71.015, enacted
by the Missouri Legislature in 1953. Act of July 10, 1953, ch. 71, 1953 Mo. Laws 309
(codified as amended at Mo. REV. STAT. § 71.015 (Supp. 1984)). The Act applies to
annexations by all incorporated municipalities, but does not apply to those by towns
and villages. Towns and villages annex territory by filing a petition with the county
court and securing a judicial order approving the annexation. See Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 80.030 (1978). A 1963 amendment to the Sawyer Act, however, applied the Act to
towns and villages in first-class charter counties. See infra notes 67-71 and accompany-
ing text. Constitutional charter cities are also exempt from the Act because section
71.015's requirements conflicted with time limits set forth in the Missouri Constitution.
See Mo. CONST. art. VI, §§ 19-20. See McConnel v. Kansas City, 282 S.W.2d 518 (Mo.
1965) (not improper for constitutional charter city to use Sawyer Act procedures).
11. Prior to the Sawyer Act's passage, loose annexation requirements often resulted
in a scramble by unincorporated areas to incorporate so they could avoid annexation by
adjacent cities. As a result, coordination, orderly planning and development were virtu-
ally impossible. See Note, Annexation by Municipality of Adjacent Area in Missouri
Judicial Attitude Toward the Sawyer Act, 1961 WASH. U. L.Q. 159. Excessive incorpo-
rations may lead to greater fragmentation or "balkanization" of local governments. St.
Louis County is an excellent example of this phenomenon. In 1960, there were 99 in-
1985]
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limited power to extend its boundaries. A city could annex new areas
simply by adopting an ordinance defining its new boundaries and hav-
ing a majority of city electors approve the ordinance in an election.' 2
By filing a suit in equity, opponents of an annexation could challenge
the city's action as an unreasonable exercise of its police power. These
efforts were rarely successful, however, because the city ordinance car-
ried a strong presumption of reasonableness. 13
The Missouri legislature altered its deferential view towards munici-
pal annexations when it passed the Sawyer Act. The Act tempered a
municipality's ability to extend its boundaries by giving the judiciary
power to review annexations.14 Following the passage of an ordinance
approving an annexation, the Act required the city to file an action in
the circuit court having jurisdiction over the unincorporated area. The
court had to issue a favorable declaratory judgment order before a mu-
nicipality could implement the annexation. The Act required the city
to define the boundaries of the territory encompassed by the proposed
annexation, prove the annexation's reasonableness and necessity to the
city's development and establish that it could deliver municipal serv-
corporated cities in the county; some cities incorporated as a defensive measure to avoid
annexation by an adjoining city. See City of Olivette v. Graeler, 338 S.W.2d 827, 837
(Mo. 1960). The Missouri legislature attempted to remedy these problems by imposing
stricter annexation requirements in the Sawyer Act. For a discussion of the Sawyer
Act, see Salsich, Local Government in Missouri: The Crossroads Reached, 32 Mo. L.
REV. 73, 76-77 (1967).
12. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 73.050 (1959) (first-class cities) (repealed 1975); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 75.020 (1959) (second-class cities) (repealed 1975). The process still ap-
plies to annexations in third- and fourth-class cities. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 77.020
(1978) (third class cities); Mo. REV. STAT. § 79.020 (1978) (fourth-class cities).
13. Johnson v. Parkville, 269 S.W.2d 775 (1954). After the city council passed an
annexation ordinance, a suit in equity to enjoin enforcement or a suit by quo warranto
were the only methods available to challenge an annexation's reasonableness. Note,
supra note 11, at 160; Koslovsky, Recent Developments of the Law of Annexation in
Missouri, 1984 J. Mo. BAR 232, 232-33. The annexation opponent had a difficult bur-
den of proof because the ordinance carried a strong presumption of reasonableness. The
courts limited their role to determining whether "the exercise of legislative powers has
been arbitrary and unreasonable." City of St. Joseph v. Hankinson, 312 S.W.2d 4, 8
(Mo. 1958). See also Ozier v. City of Sheldon, 218 S.W.2d 133 (Mo. Ct. App. 1949)
(annexation solely for tax benefits is unreasonable).
14. The Missouri Municipal League notes that annexation in Missouri involves both
the legislative and judicial processes. Through the legislative process, cities initiate and
carry out the statutory procedure applicable to their particular municipality after deter-
mining the necessity of the annexation and the extent of the proposed boundaries.
Courts then determine whether the annexation is reasonable and necessary. See Mis-
SOURI MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, REPORT ON ANNEXATION LAW IN MISSOURI (June
1982).
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ices to the new area within a reasonable amount of time. 5 Before it
could grant the declaratory judgment, the court had to determine that
the city's petition met these requirements. 16
B. The Sawyer Act's Constitutionality
In City of St. Joseph v. Hankinson,'7 opponents of the new annexa-
tion scheme challenged the Sawyer Act on grounds that it unconstitu-
tionally delegated the legislature's power to grant or restrict
annexations to the judiciary. 8 The opponents of a proposed annexa-
15. The full text of the Sawyer Act provides as follows:
Whenever the governing body of any city has adopted a resolution to annex any
unincorporated area of land, such city shall, before proceeding as otherwise author-
ized by law or charter for annexation of unincorporated areas, file an action in the
circuit court of the county in which such unincorporated area is situated, under the
provisions of chapter 527, RSMo., praying for a declaratory judgment authorizing
such annexation. The petition in such action shall state facts showing: (1) The area
to be annexed; (2) That such annexation is reasonable and necessary to the proper
development of said city; and (3) The ability of said city to furnish normal munici-
pal services of said city to said unincorporated area within a reasonable time after
said annexation is to become effective. Such action shall be a class action against
the inhabitants of such unincorporated area under the provisions of section
507.070, RSMo.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 71.015 (1978) (repealed 1980). The Missouri Legislature substan-
tially restructured the Sawyer Act in 1980. See infra notes 89-97 and accompanying
text.
16. The Sawyer Act's primary departure from the existing annexation scheme was
the requirement that municipalities file a declaratory judgment action. Missouri courts
previously had considered the "reasonableness" of an annexation by considering a
number of factors focusing on the needs of the annexing municipality. See Note, supra
note 11, at 162. For an example of the factors considered by Missouri courts prior to
the Sawyer Act, see Major v. Kansas City, 233 Mo. 162, 213-14, 134 S.W. 1007, 1022
(1911) (en banc). Major, a quo warranto action challenging an amendment to the city
charter concerning new territory, upheld an annexation after determining that the terri-
tory to be annexed: 1) was platted and offered for sale or use as city lots; 2) was held by
the owner to be marketed as city property when its value reached the owner's asking
price; 3) represented municipal growth beyond old legal boundaries; 4) was necessary to
provide adequate municipal services; and 5) was valuable because of its proximity to the
municipality. Id. The court indicated that municipalities may not annex territory when
the land is primarily used for agricultural purposes or is vacant and will not derive
special value from being adapted to urban use. Id. at 214, 134 S.W. at 1022.
17. 312 S.W.2d 4 (Mo. 1958).
18. The Missouri Constitution grants the legislature authority to annex territory
with varying restrictions. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 71.015 (1959) (provisions affecting all
cities) (repealed 1970); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 73.030-.060 (1959) (provisions affecting
first-class cities) (repealed 1975). Opponents of the annexation argued that the legisla-
ture "bargained away" strictly legislative authority under the constitution by authoriz-
ing the judiciary to determine the reasonableness and necessity of an annexation prior to
1985]
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tion by the City of St. Joseph claimed that the Act failed to provide the
courts with sufficient guidelines for reviewing annexation actions.19
They argued that by allowing the judiciary to determine whether an
annexation was reasonable and necessary,20 the legislature invalidly
gave the courts "broad power to determine the political and economic
expediency" of an annexation, thus violating the separation of powers
between the legislative and judicial branches.21
The Missouri Supreme Court rejected this constitutional attack22
and in its opinion laid the groundwork for future annexation cases.23
The court held that the Sawyer Act did not confer additional power to
the judiciary but merely changed the procedures a city must follow
before it could annex new territory.24 The Hankinson court, however,
its approval. 312 S.W.2d at 7. The annexation opponents based their argument on the
well settled rule that disallows delegation of strictly legislative powers to nonlegislative
entities. See D. MANDELKER, supra note 1, at 41-52.
19. 312 S.W.2d at 7. The city argued that the vague and indefinite standards in the
Sawyer Act did not provide an adequate determination of the inhabitants' and property
owners' individual rights. Id. The city also argued that the statute did not expressly
give the court authority to approve annexations. Id. The court noted, however, that the
substantive question was whether the Sawyer Act improperly delegated legislative func-
tions to the judiciary. Id. The court rejected this claim by asserting the principle that
when the legislature "prescribes the conditions necessary for an annexation, it may dele-
gate to the courts the power to determine whether those conditions exist; and such is a
proper judicial function or one of a mixed legislative and judicial nature." Id. at 8.
20. See supra note 14.
21. 312 S.W.2d at 8. The annexation opponents relied on several out of state cases
that held annexation statutes invalid for improperly delegating legislative power to the
judiciary. See, e.g., Klise v. Town of Riverdale, 244 Iowa 423, 57 N.W.2d 63 (1953)
(court determination of whether annexation is "desirable" constitutes improper delega-
tion of power). The Missouri Supreme Court found that those cases merely held that
the legislature may not delegate to the judiciary the broad power to determine the polit-
ical and economic expediency of an annexation, or provide the courts general discretion
to determine whether the "public interest" requires an annexation. 312 S.W.2d at 8.
For a more recent example of an annexation statute's improper delegation of power, see
Town of Beloit v. City of Beloit, 37 Wis. 2d 637, 155 N.W.2d 633 (1968) (judicial
determination of "public interest" in annexation statute improperly delegates constitu-
tional authority). D. MANDELKER, supra note 1, at 50-52 (reviewing the scope ofjudi-
cial review and the rule of reason in annexation cases).
22. 312 S.W.2d at 10.
23. Hankinson established the basic framework for judicial review in annexation
cases under the Sawyer Act. Hankinson has been followed in many later annexation
opinions. See, e.g., Binger v. City of Independence, 588 S.W.2d 481, 483 (Mo. 1979);
City of Des Peres v. Stapleton, 524 S.W.2d 203, 207 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); City of Creve
Coeur v. Huddleston, 405 S.W.2d 536, 539-40 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966).
24. 312 S.W.2d at 9-10. The Hankinson court held that the Sawyer Act simply
codified the general powers exercised by the judiciary in annexation cases. Id. The
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limited the judiciary's role to determining, "in advance of the consum-
mated annexation,"2 whether the ordinance approved by a city was so
unreasonable and unnecessary as to be an arbitrary and oppressive ex-
ercise of the city's legislative power.2 6 The court added that the Saw-
yer Act sufficiently prescribed the conditions municipalities must meet
and the guidelines courts must follow in determining whether an an-
nexation can proceed.2 7 In testing the reasonableness and necessity of
an annexation, the Hankinson court determined that legislative intent
required courts to apply the principles and standards they had applied
prior to the enactment of the Sawyer Act.2" The court placed particu-
lar emphasis on the principle, followed in earlier annexation cases,29
that a court confine its consideration of a proposed annexation to deter-
court found that the Act only imposed additional procedural restrictions upon the
power to annex. Id. The annexation statute did not give the court any power or author-
ity which they did not have already, but merely permitted courts to exercise their power
in advance of the annexation. Id.
25. Id. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
26. 312 S.W.2d at 9.
27. Id. at 10. The court reasoned that prior decisions had fixed the meaning of the
terms used in the Sawyer Act and concluded that the statute clearly established the
conditions upon which an annexation may proceed. Noting that the Act's reliance on
annexation precedent gave meaning to its terms, the court stated:
The court does not now, and never did, consummate an annexation. It merely
declares the legislative action valid or invalid. If the court now finds that the
required conditions have been met it merely authorizes the city to proceed with the
annexation under the general laws applicable to it .... As interpreted and con-
strued in the light of our established adjudications, we hold that § 71.015 is not
unconstitutional ....
312 S.W.2d at 10. See also infra note 28.
28. 312 S.W.2d at 10. The court presumed that the legislature used the words "rea-
sonable" and "necessary" in the Sawyer Act in light of, and as defined and construed in,
the court's previous annexation cases. Id. at 8. For a list of principles that courts ap-
plied prior to the Sawyer Act to determine the reasonableness of an annexation, see
supra note 16. See also Taylor ex rel. Kansas City v. North Kansas City, 360 Mo. 374,
378, 228 S.W.2d 762, 774 (1950) (en banc) (in addition to the principles established by
the Major case, the court should consider whether the territory proposed to be annexed:
I) had city advantages; 2) would make the city limits regular; 3) would tend to secure
uniform grade and street alignment; 4) is required by public convenience; and 5) is
necessary to foster the growth and prosperity of the city); Dressel v. City of Crestwood,
257 S.W.2d 236 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953) (reasonableness shown where land annexed is
adaptable to urban purposes and is necessary or convenient to the exercising of an an-
nexing city's government); Note, supra note 11, at 162 (pre-Sawyer Act cases reflect a
preoccupation with the needs of the annexing city).
29. See supra note 28. See also Mallett ex rel. Womack v. City of Joplin, 332 Mo.
1193, 62 S.W.2d 393 (1933) (whether annexation upheld by showing reasonableness is a
fairly debatable question).
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mining whether the evidence shows the reasonableness of the annexa-
tion is "fairly debatable."3 If the evidence is sufficient to meet the
"fairly debatable" standard, then the court must defer to the legislative
discretion of the local governing board, and the municipality can annex
the adjacent territory. 31
The Hankinson court's interpretation of the Sawyer Act placed the
burden of proving an annexation's reasonableness on the annexing
city.32 Considering what evidence would satisfy the burden of proof,
the Missouri Supreme Court held it would review the particular facts
of each annexation in light of the criteria considered in previous annex-
ation decisions.3  One key factor considered by the Hankinson court
30. 312 S.W.2d at 8, 20. The Hankinson court stated the universal rule that a court
cannot:
substitute its discretion or judgment as to the advisability or propriety of the an-
nexation for that of the legislative body of the city.., its consideration of "reason-
ableness" is confined to a determination of whether there exists a sufficient showing
of reasonableness to make that question, at the least, a fairly debatable one; if there
is such, then the discretion of the legislative body is conclusive.
Id. at 8. City of Joplin sheds further light on the "fairly debatable" standard. If the
evidence demonstrates that the annexation is "fairly debatable," then the court will
approve the expansion of city boundaries. City of Joplin, 332 Mo. at 1205, 62 S.W.2d at
398. As the Missouri Supreme Court stated in City of Joplin:
If the question of whether or not the territory involved should be included within
the city limits was fairly debatable, that is, if there was substantial evidence each
way so that reasonable men would differ about its necessity, then the decision of
that question was for the city council and the city electorate and not for the court.
Id.
31. 312 S.W.2d at 8. The "fairly debatable question" principle is an appropriate
method to limit the judicial scope of review in annexation cases. The judiciary's role is
to check the arbitrary and abusive exercise of legislative power, not frustrate the local
governing body's proper legislative function.
32. 312 S.W.2d at 10. The Sawyer Act placed the burden of proceeding, and of
filing a suit and praying for a declaratory judgment, upon the city. Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 71.015 (1959) (repealed 1980). The Hankinson court found that the burden of proof
requirement obligates the city to make a prima facie showing that it has not exercised its
discretionary and legislative powers in an unreasonable or arbitrary fashion. 312
S.W.2d at 10. Accord City of St. Charles v. Schone, 569 S.W.2d 769, 774 (Mo. Ct. App.
1978); cf. City of St. Ann v. Buschard, 299 S.W.2d 546, 552 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957) (legis-
lature intended the city to both allege and prove the allegations in its annexation
petition).
33. 312 S.W.2d at 17. For a list of the factors considered by the Missouri Supreme
Court in previous annexation cases, see the discussion of the Major case, supra note 16,
and the discussion of the Taylor case, supra note 28. The court indicated that all factors
favoring annexation need not be present in a given annexation proposal. Each annexa-
tion would be reviewed on the record presented by the city. The court's rationale
stemmed from its concern that the judiciary should not interfere with the local gov-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol29/iss1/8
MISSOURI'S ANNEXATION SCHEME
was the steady movement of population from the City of St. Joseph to
adjacent areas where land was available for residential development.34
The gradual migration of population to neighboring territory created
many social and business ties between residents in the city and those
persons residing in the proposed annexation area.35 The court also
erning body's legislative discretion in annexation decisions. Citing City of Joplin, the
court stated:
It is no province of the court to substitute its own judgment of what would be the
best or most advisable line for the extended limits; it is not its province to subtract
or add to the territory selected by the municipality to be annexed; its sole duty is to
examine the extension as actually attempted and to say whether it should remain.
312 S.W.2d at 17-18. See also supra note 28. Subsequent Missouri courts have fol-
lowed, although slightly modified, the case-by-case principle. See, e.g., City of Cameron
v. Stafford, 466 S.W.2d 115, 120 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971) (no factor standing alone controls
or is sufficient to prove that the reasonableness of an annexation is fairly debatable, but
each factor if relevant under the circumstances of the case, is to be considered in rela-
tion to the others). More recent annexation decisions generally consider evidence
presented by a city seeking to annex adjacent territory in light of more comprehensive
criteria than pre-Sawyer Act cases. Although not exclusive, a list of criteria is included
in City of Perryville v. Brewer, 557 S.W.2d 457, 467 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977). The criteria
include: 1) a need for residential or industrial sites within the proposed area; 2) the
city's inability to meet its needs without expansion; 3) sole consideration of needs that
are reasonably foreseeable and not visionary; 4) past growth that may relate to future
necessity; 5) evaluating future needs by reviewing whether past growth caused the city
to spill over into the proposed area; 6) the beneficial effect of uniform application and
enforcement of municipal zoning ordinances in the city and in the annexed area; 7) the
need for or the beneficial effect of uniform application and enforcement of municipal
building, plumbing and electrical codes; 8) the need for or the beneficial effect of ex-
tending police protection to the annexed area; 9) the need for or the beneficial effect of
uniform application and enforcement of municipal ordinances or regulations pertaining
to health; 10) the need for and the ability of the city to extend essential municipal
services into the annexed area; 11) enhancement in value by reason of adaptability of the
land proposed to be annexed for prospective city uses; and 12) the regularity of bounda-
ries. Accord City of Town and Country v. St. Louis County, 657 S.W.2d 598, 610 n.2
(Mo. 1983) (en banc). See also Koslovsky, supra note 13, at 233 (placing annexation
factors into categories based upon whether they are susceptible to proof by objective
fact, are subjective in nature, or involve both objective and subjective elements).
34. 312 S.W.2d at 18. A large part of St. Joseph's population had moved into
densely settled suburban subdivisions. The court viewed these residential developments
as part of the growth of the city. Id. The growth of suburban residential areas outside
city boundaries is called the "spillover effect." See, e.g., Hudson Community Ass'n v.
City of Ferguson, 456 S.W.2d 581, 585 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970) (lack of vacant property in
the city created spillover of population in annexed area); cf. City of Mexico v. Hodges,
482 S.W.2d 545, 551 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972) (absence of spillover of population from city
to unincorporated area).
35. 312 S.W.2d at 20. The evidence showed 59% of household heads in the pro-
posed annexation area were employed in the City of St. Joseph. In addition, 20 or more
streets extended from the city to the area. Id. at 13. Subsequent annexation cases have
19851
Washington University Open Scholarship
196 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 29:187
noted that St. Joseph had studied carefully the proposed annexation for
several years.36 The study demonstrated that the annexation would be
important to the city's future "realistic" growth.3 7 The court con-
cluded that St. Joseph sustained its burden of proving that the reasona-
bleness of its proposed annexation was at least a debatable question.3 8
C. Judicial Application of the Sawyer Act in Missouri's Urban
Counties
1. The Graeler I & I1 Decisions
The Hankinson decision established the constitutionality of the Saw-
yer Act and articulated the general principles courts should use to re-
view annexation proposals. The Hankinson court, however, left for
future courts the task of determining the various factors to apply in
evaluating the reasonableness of an annexation. 9 In City of Olivette v.
Graeler (Graeler 1),4' which involved an annexation proposal in St.
Louis County,4" the Missouri Supreme Court identified additional fac-
recognized the importance of community ties between the annexing city and the terri-
tory sought to be annexed. See, e.g., Mayor of Liberty v. Beard, 613 S.W.2d 642, 655
(Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (annexation necessary to control an area that has community of
interest with the city).
36. 312 S.W.2d at 20.
37. Id. The Court noted that "a city may, to a reasonable extent, look to its future
needs in planning and making an annexation." Id. at 18. Evidence that growth has been
slow in the past should not defeat the reasonableness of an annexation so long as its
present prospects have a realistic basis. Id. at 20. Later courts have adopted the Han-
kinson approach by evaluating whether the potential growth of an annexing city is "rea-
sonably foreseeable." See, e.g., City of O'Fallon v. Bethman, 569 S.W.2d 295, 301 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1978) (annexed land needed to accommodate natural expansion and growth
within the reasonably foreseeable future); cf. City of Cameron v. Stafford, 466 S.W.2d
115, 122 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971) (city's hope for future growth not likely in the foreseeable
future).
38. 312 S.W.2d at 20.
39. See, e.g., Binger v. City of Independence, 588 S.W.2d 481, 486-87 (Mo. 1979)
(necessity of annexation based on expected growth in population and substantial indus-
trial and commercial development); City of Perryville v. Brewer, 557 S.W.2d 457, 462
(Mo. Ct. App. 1977); City of Des Peres v. Stapleton, 524 S.W.2d 203, 209 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1975) (annexation necessary to meet growth needs; minimal amount of vacant
land available within city); City of Mexico v. Hodges, 482 S.W.2d 545, 549-50 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1972) (annexation denied; boundaries of proposed area irregular; part of annexed
land unsuitable for development); City of Creve Coeur v. Brame, 446 S.W.2d 173, 176
(Mo. Ct. App. 1969) (annexation necessary for residential development; history of con-
tinuous growth; annexed area will receive better services).
40. 338 S.W.2d 827 (Mo. 1960).
41. In Graeler I, the City of Olivette in St. Louis County filed a declaratory judg-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol29/iss1/8
MISSOURI'S ANNEXATION SCHEME
tors for courts to consider before approving annexations in urban areas.
Initially, the Graeler court reaffirmed its position in Hankinson that
factors developed by pre-Sawyer Act cases should continue to guide
courts in evaluating the reasonableness of a particular annexation pro-
posal.4" In addition, however, the Graeler I court emphasized that the
judiciary must consider new laws and modem economic and social
trends in evaluating annexation proposals.43 Noting St. Louis
County's unique status as a home rule charter county under the Mis-
souri Constitution" and finding a growing tendency by the legislature
to delegate urban counties greater authority to perform municipal serv-
ices,45 the court held that it must weigh St. Louis County's interest as a
community against claims made by an annexing city in determining the
reasonableness of an annexation.46
ment action under § 71.015 of the Sawyer Act in furtherance of its proposal to annex an
adjoining area. 338 S.W.2d at 830. The original defendants, inhabitants and landown-
ers in the area to be annexed, were sued as representatives of a class opposed to the
annexation. Id. The trial court initially approved the proposed annexation but later
sustained the defendants' motion for a new trial and entered judgment dismissing the
city's petition. Id. The trial court concluded that § 71.015 did not apply to the area
sought to be annexed because it received municipal-type services from St. Louis County
and was, therefore, not an "unincorporated area" within the meaning of the statute. Id.
The court of appeals transferred the case to the Missouri Supreme Court because it
involved an interpretation of Art. VI, § 18 of the Missouri Constitution, which confers
home rule powers to first-class charter counties. Id. The defendants argued that St.
Louis County is a body corporate and politic with all the powers and authority of a
municipal corporation in relation to areas outside the boundaries of incorporated mu-
nicipalities in the County. Id. at 834. Moreover, the defendants claimed that the Saw-
yer Act did not apply because the area in question was within the "municipal sphere" of
the county, and therefore, not an unincorporated area available for annexation. The
court rejected this argument and held that any territory outside the boundaries of incor-
porated cities is an unincorporated area within the meaning of the Sawyer Act. Id. at
836. Despite its corporate arm of organization and its municipal-type functions, St.
Louis County was not an incorporated city as defined in the annexation statutes. Id. at
835.
42. See 338 S.W.2d at 837. See also supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
43. 338 S.W.2d at 837.
44. St. Louis County adopted its home rule charter pursuant to Article VI, § 18(a)
of the Missouri Constitution in 1950. The County had unique status until 1973, when
Jackson County also adopted a home rule charter. See Mo. CONsr. art. VI, § 18(a).
45. 338 S.W.2d at 838. "The legislative trend has been to vest counties with greater
authority to perform services of a local or municipal nature. This permissive legislation
and the extent to which it is used must be taken into consideration in determining
whether the annexation is authorized." Id.
46. Id. "The interest of the county as a community must be weighed against the
claims of the city because the county's municipal powers are also provided by law and
are a part of the public policy of the state." Id. For later cases citing Graeler I for this
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The Graeler I court also determined that annexations in St. Louis
County affect the entire metropolitan community, not just the annex-
ing city and residents of the unincorporated territory.47 The Missouri
Supreme Court did not specifically explain how it reached this conclu-
sion. The court found, however, that annexations had increased com-
petition among cities for unincorporated areas and led to further
decentralization within the county, thus affecting the St. Louis metro-
politan area.48 Finding it appropriate for a court to consider the
"proper development" of a city49 when evaluating an annexation pro-
posal, the Graeler I court stated that it was also appropriate to consider
the interests of the St. Louis County community.50 The court reasoned
that the legislature intended that the interests of both the annexing city
and residents of the proposed annexation territory be considered before
courts approve an annexation under the Sawyer Act.5' Because St.
Louis County had been delivering municipal services to unincorpo-
proposition, see St. Louis County v. Village of Champ, 438 S.W.2d 205, 212 (Mo. 1969)
(en banc); City of Olivette v. Graeler, 369 S.W.2d 85, 94 (Mo. 1963) (Graeler II); City
of St. Peter v. Kodner Development Corp., 525 S.W.2d 97, 100 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975);
City of Des Peres v. Stapleton, 524 S.W.2d 203, 209 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); City of Creve
Coeur v. Huddleston, 405 S.W.2d 536, 540 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966).
47- 338 S.W.2d at 838.
48. Id. at 837-38. The Graeler I court noted that some unincorporated areas incor-
porate only to avoid annexation by an adjoining city. Frequently referred to as "defen-
sive incorporations," these incorporations have increased decentralization and affected
industry and development of St. Louis County. While the court's explanation of the
link between competition for unincorporated territory and its effect on the metropolitan
community is weak, perhaps the court considered that annexations in a highly devel-
oped urban county affect the orderly growth and development of an entire region, not
simply the development of an annexing city and the unincorporated territory. NA-
TIONAL LEAGUE, supra note 1, at 1-2 (annexations are sound base for area-wide action
and orderly growth).
49. 338 S.W.2d at 838. The court considered the proper development of a city as
one of the "elements of the issues of necessity and reasonableness." Id. The defendants
in Graeler I argued that the municipality must show that an annexation is reasonable to
all interested parties. The city asserted that the test of reasonableness goes only to "the
proper development of the annexing city." Id. at 836. The city's contention appeared
justified on the basis of prior annexation decisions. See Note, supra note 11, at 162.
50. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
51. See 338 S.W.2d at 837. The precise language of the Sawyer Act states that an
annexation must be "reasonable and necessary to the proper development of said city."
Id. at 836. The Graeler I court found that the provision by itself "is confusing" but the
intent of the legislature was to apply the reasonableness test to both the annexing city
and the residents in the annexed territory. Id. at 837. The court stated:
The reasonableness of an annexation by a city has always been held to be a subject
of judicial inquiry largely because the inhabitants of the adjacent territory have no
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rated areas targeted for annexation,52 the Graeler I court concluded
that the lower courts reviewing annexations should consider the serv-
ices provided by the county to the territory encompassed by the pro-
posed annexation and determine whether these services should be
replaced by those of the annexing city.53 The Missouri Supreme Court
remanded the case to the lower court for review of the annexation pro-
posal under the standards stressed in Graeler i"
While Graeler I established the general standards that the Sawyer
Act required a court to apply to annexations in urban counties," the
court did not identify the interests of the county as a community.
Graeler I also left unanswered how a court should weigh the county's
interests against the interests of a city seeking to annex adjacent terri-
tory. The court had an opportunity to resolve these issues in City of
Olivette v. Graeler (Graeler II).56
Following remand of Graeler I, the lower court found the Olivette
annexation necessary to the proper development of the city, reasonable
to the inhabitants and owners in the city and the annexation area, and
in the best interests of St. Louis County as a community." The Mis-
part in the selection of the city officers who initiate the annexation proceeding nor a
vote in the city election by which it is confirmed.
Id. at 836. Because the legislature did not contemplate abandonment of the judicial
review function when it enacted the Sawyer Act, the Graeler I court inferred that it was
appropriate to consider the interests of the proposed annexation territory when assess-
ing the reasonableness of an annexation. Id.
52. Mo. CONST. art. VI, § 18(a) authorizes a home rule charter for counties with
more than 85,000 residents. Article VI, § 18(c) authorizes home rule charter counties
to exercise legislative power pertaining to public health, police, traffic safety, building
construction, and planning and zoning in the part of the county outside incorporated
cities. Id.
53. 338 S.W.2d at 838. Included among the services St. Louis County provided to
the unincorporated area that the City of Olivette wanted to annex were: zoning and
planning, traffic safety, police protection, health and sanitation services, a county hospi-
tal, and road building and maintenance. Id.
54. Id. On remand, St. Louis County and the County Supervisor intervened to op-
pose the annexation. General Electric Company and Monsanto Chemical Company
also were granted leave to intervene because they owned industrial property in the unin-
corporated area and opposed the annexation. Other corporations owning industrial
property in the area sought to be annexed by Olivette also joined the suit. Id.
55. See supra note 46-51 and accompanying text. See also Lauer, Municipal Law in
Missouri, 28 Mo. L. REV. 555, 581 (1963) (reviewing the effects of the Graeler I
decision).
56. City of Olivette v. Grader, 369 S.W.2d 85 (Mo. 1963).
57. Id. at 92-93. The trial court's opinion is unreported, but the Missouri Supreme
Court discussed the lower court's decision in its Graeler II opinion. In Graeler II, the
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souri Supreme Court reversed, holding that the interests of the county
outweighed the city's need for the area. The court also found that the
proposed annexation would not be reasonable to the residents and
property owners in the territory sought to be annexed. 58
The Graeler 11 court distinguished the standards that courts should
apply to annexations in highly developed and substantially urban areas,
such as St. Louis County, from the standards that should apply to an-
nexations in the less populated and less developed parts of the state.59
Substantial industry had settled in the unincorporated areas of St.
Louis County.6' The county had developed an effective organization
that provided residents in unincorporated areas all the normal services
and advantages that any municipality within the county could de-
liver.6 The Graeler II court also recognized that further development
of St. Louis County's unincorporated areas would help maintain the
tax base necessary for the county to furnish vital local services. 62 Con-
sequently, the supreme court held that courts must consider the
Missouri Supreme Court noted that the lower court's findings "were most general." Id.
at 93. In addition to the findings noted in the text, the trial court also found that the
City of Olivette had the ability to furnish normal municipal services within a reasonable
time. Id. The Graeler II court also reiterated the relevant rules established by Graeler I
and stated it would consider these rules along with the usual guides laid down in annex-
ation cases. Id. at 93-94.
58. Id. at 94.
59. Id. The Graeler H court noted that some of the older rules applied to annexa-
tions in less developed parts of the state are inapplicable to annexations in urban St.
Louis County. Because unincorporated sections of urban counties can be as completely
developed under a county government as under a municipal government, the court de-
termined "that in this highly developed and substantially urbanized community we
have a situation materially different from those which exist in annexation proceedings
elsewhere." Id. at 95.
60. Id. The court recognized that St. Louis County's population had vastly in-
creased and that a significant number of corporations found it desirable to develop their
operations in locations outside of the municipalities. Id. at 94-95. The court noted that
some of these developed, yet unincorporated areas were annexed quickly by neighboring
municipalities in disregard of the County's interests and the interests of some of the
property owners in the annexed areas. Id. at 95. The Graeler I1 court emphasized the
observation made in Graeler I, that there was a great deal of competition among cities
for unincorporated territory and concluded that "the race for annexations has become
somewhat unseemly." At the time Graeler HI was decided, there were 29 annexation
suits pending in St. Louis County. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. The supreme court determined that the trial court record suggested the
need for St. Louis County to maintain an adequate tax base by retaining and developing
industry in unincorporated areas. See id.
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county's general interest in the unincorporated area and the effects of
the proposed annexation not only in connection with services rendered,
but also with regard to the county's loss of control of the annexed
63territory.
Turning to the facts of the case, the court viewed Olivette's annexa-
tion as an attempt to acquire more tax revenues without providing ad-
ditional benefits to residents and property owners whom the county
already served adequately." The territory Olivette sought was highly
developed and constituted an important part of the county's plans for
future growth and development. 65 Finding no substantial evidence to
support the annexation's reasonableness, the court held that the city
failed to prove the elements required by the Sawyer Act.
66
2. Broadening the Scope of the Sawyer Act
a. Statutory Changes
After the Graeler II decision, the Missouri legislature changed the
annexation scheme for St. Louis County. 67 First, the legislature broad-
ened the scope of the Sawyer Act. Instead of limiting the Act to incor-
porated municipalities, the legislature extended it to all cities, towns,
63. See id. at 94. After reviewing Graeler II one commentator speculated that
Graeler II, while not inhibiting future annexations entirely, placed a very heavy burden
on municipalities to establish "not merely that the particular annexation is reasonable
and necessary with respect to the municipality and the area to be annexed, but also that
it is consistent with the interests of St. Louis County as a whole." See Lauer, supra note
55, at 582.
64. 369 S.W.2d at 94. Underscoring the battle for control of unincorporated terri-
tory is the right to collect tax revenues from residential, commercial and industrial
property owners. The Graeler II court recognized the tax consequences implicit in
annexation disputes and supported the county's need to maintain an adequate tax base.
The court held that "so long as the County has an effective county organization, it
should not be whittled away to a mere shell by annexations which have as their prime
purpose the acquisition of more city taxes." Id. at 95.
65, Id.
66. Id. After reviewing the trial court record and assessing the evidence bearing on
the proposed annexation, the Graeler II court concluded that the city could not estab-
lish the overall reasonableness and necessity of the annexations in light of the court's
recent constructions of the Sawyer Act (Graeler 1). Id. In sum, the court found that
"the annexation would simply impose city taxes upon the residents and property owners
of the unincorporated area, without added benefits." Id. at 94.
67. See Act of July 19, 1963, ch. 71, 1963 Mo. Laws 126 (codified as amended at
Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 71.870-.880, 71.920 (Supp. 1984)). See also MISSOURI MUNICIPAL
LEAGUE, supra note 14, at 3 (describing Sawyer Act amendments of 1963).
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and villages located in first class charter counties.68 More significantly,
the amendments altered the election requirements applicable to annex-
ations in first class charter counties. Under the new election provi-
sions, both the city or town attempting the annexation and the target
unincorporated area must hold an election. 69 The two elections must
be held simultaneously.7° Furthermore, separate majorities of the vot-
ers in each area must approve the annexation before the annexing mu-
nicipality can file a declaratory judgment action seeking court
68. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 71.860 (1978). Prior to the 1963 amendments, the Saw-
yer Act's annexation procedures applied only to first-class cities (communities with
more than 65,000 inhabitants), second-class cities (communities with more than 27,500
inhabitants and less than 100,000 inhabitants), third-class cities (communities with
3,000 and less than 30,000 inhabitants), and fourth-class cities (communities with 500
inhabitants and less than 3,000 inhabitants). Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 72.010-.040 (1959)
(§§ 72.010-.020 repealed in 1975).
The Sawyer Act previously did not apply to towns, villages and constitutional charter
cities. The legislature's 1963 amendments extended the Sawyer Act's requirement to
towns, villages and constitutional charter cities in first-class charter counties. In 1963
the amendment pertained only to St. Louis County. See supra note 6; St. Louis County
v. Village of Champ, 438 S.W.2d 205, 213 (Mo. 1969) (en banc) (reviewing the effect of
the 1963 amendments on villages in St. Louis County).
69. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 71.870 (1978). The mandatory election provision in-
jected a new twist into the annexation process in first-class counties. Previously, an
election was not required among the voters in either the annexing municipality or in the
unincorporated area the municipality was seeking to annex. The legislative body of the
annexing municipality that was within the scope of the Sawyer Act simply had to adopt
a resolution to annex the adjacent area and file a declaratory judgment action seeking
court approval. The 1963 amendments, however, required separate elections in both the
annexing municipality and the unincorporated area. The mandatory election procedure
applied only to first-class charter counties such as St. Louis County and, later, Jackson
County which includes Kansas City. The election provision states that:
The legislative body of any city, town or village located within the boundaries of a
first class chartered county shall not have the power to extend the limits of such
city, town or village by annexation of unincorporated territory adjacent to the city,
town or village in accordance with the provisions of law relating to annexation by
such municipalities until [an election is held] at which the proposition for annexa-
tion is carried by a majority of the total votes cast in th city, town or village and by
a separate majority of the total votes cast in the unincorporated territory sought to
be annexed. There shall be separate elections submitting the proposition of annexa-
tion to the two groups of voters, the same to be held simultaneously.
Id.
In 1980, the legislature amended the Sawyer Act to provide for simultaneous elec-
tions where annexations are proposed in nonfirst-class charter counties and written ob-
jection is filed with the governing body of the annexing municipality. See Mo. REV.
STAT. §§ 71.012, 71.015 (Supp. 1984).
70. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 71.870 (1978).
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approval.71
b. The Champ Decision
In St. Louis County v. Village of Champ,7 z the Missouri Supreme
Court revealed the effects that the legislation's new requirements would
have on future annexations. The Village of Champ73 sought additional
land to attract industrial plants to the area.74 Champ proposed two
annexations 75 and both received unanimous votes in the village and in
71. Id. The 1963 amendments also included a provision that ostensibly exempted
annexing municipalities from the Sawyer Act's declaratory judgment provisions in lim-
ited situations. If both the annexing municipality and the unincorporated area were to
vote unanimously in favor of annexation, the municipal limits could be extended by
ordinance, thus seemingly bypassing the Sawyer Act's court approval procedure. See
Mo. REv. STAT. § 71.920 (1978). But see infra notes 72-86 and accompanying text for
a discussion of St. Louis County v. Village of Champ, 438 S.W.2d 205 (Mo. 1969) (en
banc) (new election procedures did not affect judicial inquiry into an annexation's
reasonableness).
72. 438 S.W.2d 205 (Mo. 1969) (en banc).
73. The Village of Champ had a population of 25 people and comprised about one-
half square mile. Id. at 208. Champ had no street department, fire department or
police department. Id. The record showed that no residential, commercial or industrial
development was taking place within its boundaries with the exception of one four-acre
tract. Id. at 214. The village, having no present facilities of its own, was unable to
demonstrate that it could provide any sort of municipal services to the area targeted for
annexation. Id.
74. Id. at 209. Evidence introduced at trial showed that Champ wanted to annex
additional land to develop industry in the area by means of revenue-bond financing and
lease-backs. The village planned to use the revenue bonds to build industrial plants and
lease them back to private concerns. Id. The village also intended to use revenue bond
funds to purchase the R.C. Can Co., which owned a plant on the tract proposed for
annexation, and lease the plant back to the company. Id. The revenue bond and lease-
back scheme would promote industrial development by reducing the overall costs of
financing and constructing new facilities. Although the company would have to make
payments to the municipality under the lease agreement, thus providing a return for
bond holders, the company's payments under the lease are significantly less than the
cost of borrowing funds to construct and operate a facility.
The Champ court observed that, through these financing methods, a "municipality
virtually. . . lifts itself by its own bootstraps to a position where it can attract industry."
Id. at 213.
75. Id. at 206-07. Champ proposed its first annexation in 1965, which St. Louis
County attacked in the trial court. Id. at 206. While the action was pending, Champ
proceeded with a second, larger annexation in 1967, encompassing about three-and-one-
half times the size of the original village. Id. at 207. St. Louis County also challenged
the second annexation and the trial court consolidated for trial the two actions challeng-
ing Champ's annexations. Id. at 206.
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the territory encompassed by the proposed annexation.7" St. Louis
County attacked Champ's action by filing for a declaratory judgment
invalidating the annexations." The trial court entered judgment for
the village without findings of fact or conclusions of law.78 Claiming
that the trial court failed to apply properly the Sawyer Act's standards
for annexation in first class charter counties, St. Louis County appealed
to the Missouri Supreme Court.79
The supreme court speculated that the trial court may have ap-
proved Champ's annexations on the theory that the legislature's new
election requirements made judicial review unnecessary.80 Finding
that the new dual election procedures did not preclude judicial inquiry
into the reasonableness of an annexation, the court determined it could
review Champ's annexation."t Citing Graeler I and 11, the court also
76. Id. at 207. Only two families comprised of ten people lived in the annexed land.
Id. at 209. In the 1965 election, the vote was 10-0 in Champ and 5 to 0 in the annexed
area. In the 1967 election, the vote was 12 to 0 in Champ and 5 to 0 in the area pro-
posed for annexation. Id. at 207 n.3.
77. See id. at 207.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 207. Because the trial court in Champ did not make any findings of fact
or conclusions of law, the supreme court speculated over the lower court's reasons for
upholding the Champ annexation. In Champ 1, the Village of Champ argued that,
under the Sawyer Act, annexations by villages need not be subject to judicial review.
See State v. Champ, 393 S.W.2d 516, 532 (Mo. 1965) (en banc). The Champ I court
found, however, that towns and villages, like cities, are subject to judicial review of an
annexation's reasonableness. See id. The court reasoned that "the net result of respon-
dents' [Village of Champ] contention would be a holding that the Legislature intended
that towns or villages could make practically unlimited annexations." Id. Following
Champ 1, the village held annexation elections pursuant to the legislature's 1963 amend-
ments, which provided that a village or town in a first-class charter county must comply
with the Sawyer Act before extending its boundaries unless the vote in the annexation
elections is unanimous in both the village and the annexed area. In the event of a unani-
mous vote, a village did not have to file a declaratory judgment action, thus negatingjudicial review of an annexation's reasonableness. See supra note 71; City of Kirkwood
v. Allen, 399 S.W.2d 30, 34 (Mo. 1966). Because the village had complied with these
procedures, it claimed that St. Louis County did not have standing to maintain a declar-
atory judgment action challenging the validity of Champ's annexations. See 438 S.W.2d
at 211. The supreme court in Champ II surmised that the trial court entered judgment
for the village because the village had complied with the annexation statute, thus negat-
ing judicial review and the county's standing to bring a declaratory judgment action.
See id. at 213.
81. Id. at 211. Citing Champ 1, the Champ II court noted that the reasonableness
of a city's annexation is always the subject ofjudicial review, notwithstanding the unani-
mous vote election provision. Id. at 211, 213. See supra note 71 for further explanation
of Mo. REv. STAT. § 71.920 (1978). The Champ HI court explained that:
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found that the county had protected interests at stake and, therefore,
had standing to maintain its action against the village.8 2 The Champ
court paid particular attention to the increasing number of conflicts of
interest between St. Louis County and its municipalities since the
Graeler cases," a and reiterated the necessity of judicial consideration of
the county's interests as a community.8 4 Because Champ's sole pur-
pose was to promote industrial development,8 5 the court held that St.
Louis County's interests outweighed the claims of the village and thus
granted the declaratory judgment.8 6
Otherwise, any village in St. Louis County, small enough to be sure of a unanimous
vote, could succeed in annexing whatever amount of the adjacent unincorporated
area of the county it could find where it was sure the one resident therein would
vote in favor of annexation and by drawing the boundaries of the area so there
would be no other voters included.
438 SW.2d at 211.
82. Id. at 213. The Champ II court noted in strong terms that St. Louis County had
standing to maintain its declaratory judgment action. "We are convinced that St. Louis
County as a real party in interest here, has a legally protectible interest at stake." Id.
83. Id. at 212. The court attributed the heightened conflicts between St. Louis
County and its 96 separate municipalities to constitutional enactments and statutes per-
mitting cities to finance the construction of plants for manufacturing and industrial
development by revenue bonds and leasebacks. Id. These financing schemes had pro-
vided greater incentives for annexations of vacant territory adjacent to municipal bor-
ders. Id. at 213. See supra note 74.
84. Id. at 212.
85. Id. at 214. Champ argued that its plan to develop the annexed areas through
the use of municipal revenue bond financing and leaseback techniques did not make its
annexations unreasonable as a matter of law. Id. at 213. St. Louis County claimed that
Champ's plans were motivated by illegal purposes. Id. Following Champ I, the Champ
II court specifically refused to adopt a per se rule of unreasonableness for annexations
intended to further industrial development; the court equated the legislature's support
for revenue bond financing and leaseback techniques with a strong public policy favor-
ing "ambitious industrial development by municipalities." Id. The Champ II court
held that "the correct view is that if annexation is otherwise reasonable, the fact that it
also provides a method of financing does not make it objectionable, but it cannot consti-
tute the sole justification." Id. at 214.
86. Id. The court applied the Graeler I and II balancing test to determine the rea-
sonableness of Champ's annexations. Alluding to Champ's "community of interest" in
the areas designated for annexation, the court observed that the "only real tie between
Champ and the areas sought to be annexed is that annexation is a method of getting the
[new industrial] plants built." Id. While indicating that the revenue bond financing
scheme gave an annexing municipality greater weight in determining whether a pro-
posed annexation would foster growth and prosperity, the court held that Champ's an-
nexation had no reasonable basis because the city's sole motivation was to use the
annexation as a means of financing for industrial development. Accordingly, the court
concluded that the "interest of St. Louis County as a community in the areas sought to
be annexed outweighs the claims of the village. . . ." Id.
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c. Further Legislative Fine-Tuning
Following Champ, courts continued to apply the principles estab-
lished in Graeler I and II to annexations in St. Louis County.87 Mis-
souri's annexation scheme remained largely unchanged 8 until 1980,
when the legislature substantially restructured the Sawyer Act.89
Although the 1980 amendment affecting annexations did not apply to
municipalities in first class charter counties90 like St. Louis and Jack-
son, it prescribed more detailed annexation procedures for municipali-
ties located in other parts of the state. The 1980 amendments
tightened up the Sawyer Act's annexation procedures, thus making it
more difficult for municipalities to take over additional land.9' Under
the amended Act, a municipality seeking to annex unincorporated ar-
eas must satisfy five requirements. First, the annexing municipality
must prepare a comprehensive "plan of intent" that specifies the major
services presently provided by the city; a timetable for delivery of the
city's services to the area proposed for annexation; the city's system for
assessing property; the property tax rate; the zoning proposals for the
annexed area; and the effective date of the proposed annexation. 92 Sec-
ond, the 1980 amendment requires the municipality to propose an ordi-
87. See, e.g., City of Des Peres v. Stapleton, 524 S.W.2d 203 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975)
(Graeler distinguished; annexation's reasonableness upheld as fairly debatable); St.
Louis County v. Village of Peerless Park, 494 S.W.2d 673 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (annexa-
tion upheld because county did not carry burden of showing unreasonableness); Hudson
Community Ass'n v. City of Ferguson, 456 S.W.2d 581 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970) (annexa-
tion upheld; county was aggrieved but benefited by annexation).
88. The legislature made minor changes to the annexation scheme in 1973 and
1976. In 1973 House Bill 200 authorized cities in Franklin, St. Charles and Jefferson
Counties to annex territory by using landowner petitions. Act of June 27, 1973, ch. 71,
1973 Mo. Laws 161. In 1976 House Bill 1362 extended this procedure to municipali-
ties in all other counties. Act of June 23, 1976, ch. 71, 1976 Mo. Laws 617.
89. See Act of May 13, 1980, ch. 71, 1980 Mo. Laws 253 (codified at Mo. REv.
STAT. §§ 71.012, 71.015, 71.879, 71.880 (Supp. 1984)).
90. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 71.015 (Supp. 1984). Section 71.015 expressly excluded
municipalities in first-class charter counties from the new annexation requirements.
The introductory language of the section stated that the act applied only to: "[A]ny
city, town, or village, not located in any first-class county, which has adopted a constitu-
tional charter for its own local government, seek[ing] to annex an area to which objec-
tion is made . . ." Id. (emphasis added). In construing this provision, the Missouri
Attorney General ruled that municipalities in the first-class charter counties of St. Louis
and Jackson must continue to follow the annexation procedures in the original version
of§ 71.015. 45 Op. Mo. Att'y Gen. 113 (1981).
91. See MISSOURI MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, supra note 14, at 4.
92. Mo. REv. STAT. § 71.015(4)(a)-(e) (Supp. 1984).
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nance confirming that it has fulfilled or will fulfill the annexation
statute's requirements." Third, the municipality must conduct a pub-
lic hearing on the proposed ordinance.94 Fourth, the municipality
must approve the ordinance." Fifth, the municipality must file an ac-
tion for a declaratory judgment authorizing the annexation.96 If the
court approves the annexation, the Act requires separate elections in
the city and in the unincorporated territory targeted for annexation.97
In effect, these provisions compel the annexing city to devise compre-
hensive development plans so as to protect the rights and interests of
residents in unincorporated areas.
3. The Current Annexation Scheme: The Town and Country
Decision and its Aftermath
In City of Town and Country v. St. Louis County,98 the Missouri
Supreme Court had its first opportunity since Champ to apply the stat-
utory standards for annexations in St. Louis County. Town and Coun-
93. Id. § 71.015(2).
94. Id. § 71.015(3).
95. See id. § 71.015(5). Approval of the proposed annexation ordinance is a condi-
tion precedent to the filing of an action praying for a declaratory judgment authorizing
the annexation. See id.
96. Id. The petition seeking a declaratory judgment under the 1980 amendments to
the Sawyer Act includes substantially the same requirements as a petition under the
original act. Furthermore, the 1980 amendments did not affect the burden on the an-
nexing municipality to show that its annexation is "reasonable and necessary to the
proper development of the city, town, or village . I.." d. § 71.015(5)(b).
97. Id. § 71.015(6). The Missouri legislature seemingly adopted for all annexations
the dual election procedures already applicable to annexations in first-class charter
counties under § 71.870. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 71.870 (Supp. 1984). See also supra
notes 67-70 and accompanying text for an explanation of the election requirements for
annexation in first-class charter counties. Under amended § 71.015(6), once the court
authorizes a municipality to make an annexation, the annexing city and residents of the
targeted area must hold separate elections. Mo. REV. STAT. § 71.015(6) (Supp. 1984).
Separate majorities of the total votes cast in each election are required before the annex-
ation can proceed. Id. If separate majorities are not obtained, however, the annexing
city may hold another election. If less than a majority of the votes cast in the unincor-
porated area are in favor of the proposal, but a majority of the votes cast in the annexing
city approve the annexation, then dual elections must again be held within 120 days.
See id. In the second set of elections, however, the city may annex the territory only if
two-thirds of the total votes in both elections approve the annexation. Id. If the annex-
ation proposal fails to obtain the requisite vote in this second election, then a two-year
moratorium prevents annexation of any part of the unincorporated area targeted for
annexation. Id.
98. 657 S.W.2d 598 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
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try overruled the long-standing principles established in Graeler I and
I19 and held that courts no longer had to consider the interests of St.
Louis County as a community in determining the reasonableness of an
annexation."° The trial court had approved Town and County's pro-
posed annexations after concluding that one could fairly debate their
reasonableness and necessity. 1 The Missouri Court of Appeals re-
versed, relying on the Graeler cases. The appeals court found no ac-
ceptable justification for authorizing the annexations and concluded
that the annexations would be detrimental to the county as a commu-
nity.'° 2 The Missouri Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction of the case
from the court of appeals to determine the validity of the Graeler deci-
sions in light of the 1980 amendments to Missouri's annexation
scheme. 103
On appeal to the supreme court, the county argued that the Graeler
principles should remain intact." 4 Claiming that no material changes
99. See supra notes 39-66 and accompanying text (discussing the Graeler I and 1I
decisions).
100. 657 S.W.2d at 605-06.
101. Id. at 600. Because the city of Town and Country is a fourth-class city organ-
ized and existing within first-class charter St. Louis County, the Sawyer Act required
the city to follow the special election provisions applicable to annexations in first-class
charter counties. Pursuant to those requirements, the city adopted resolutions in 1977,
declaring its intention to annex three adjacent parcels of unincorporated territory. Id.
at 601. Town and Country then held dual elections on the annexation question, which
yielded majorities in both the annexing city and the unincorporated area. Id. Follow-
ing these elections, the city filed a declaratory judgment action and the trial court en-
tered a judgment approving the annexations. Id. at 600.
102. City of Town and Country v. St. Louis County, No. 42324, slip. op. (Mo. Ct.
App. 1982), rev'd, 657 S.W.2d 598 (Mo. 1983) (en banc). In invalidating Town and
Country's annexation, the court of appeals concluded:
An examination of the proposed annexations leads inexorably to one conclusion.
Whether each parcel is considered separately or together, the reasonableness of
these annexations is not fairly debatable.... We do not discern, on the record, any
justifiable reason for our approving the three proposed annexations. The County,
on the other hand, demonstrated that the annexations would be detrimental to the
County as a community. For these reasons, the judgment of the trial court is
reversed.
Id. at 9-10.
103. 657 S.W.2d at 600. See also supra notes 39-66 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the Graeler I and H decisions); notes 67-71, 87-97 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the legislative changes in Missouri's annexation scheme).
104. See Supplemental Brief for Appellee St. Louis County at 7-8, City of Town and
Country v. St. Louis County, 657 S.W.2d 598 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) [hereinafter cited as
Brief, St. Louis County]. St. Louis County's brief pointed out that Graeler I, Graeler II
and Champ "constitute the fabric of annexation law in Missouri, which recognizes that
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had occurred in either the governmental structures or the competing
interests of St. Louis County and its municipalities since Graeler I and
11,105 the county urged the court to reaffirm the interests of St. Louis
County as a community in determining the reasonableness of Town
and Country's annexations." ° A sharply divided court,10 v however,
rejected this appeal, overruled the Graeler cases, and concluded that
the county's interests were no longer factors for judicial review.10 8
In reaching its decision, the supreme court placed tremendous
weight on the dual election provision added by the legislature after
in highly urban communities where the county government provides municipal type
services and has an effective governmental organization, the interest of the county as a
community must be taken into account.... ." Id.
The City of Town and Country argued that since Graeler, the dominant role of St.
Louis County in annexation litigation has "largely dissipated." See Brief for Appellant
City of Town and Country at 59, City of Town and Country v. St. Louis County, No.
42324, slip op. (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). In support of its position, the city noted several
cases in which the county unsuccessfully opposed annexations and lost. Id. See, e.g.,
City of Des Peres v. Stapleton, 524 S.W.2d 203 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); St. Louis County
v. Village of Peerless Park, 494 S.W.2d 673 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Hudson Community
Ass'n v. City of Ferguson, 456 S.W.2d 581 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970); City of Creve Coeur v.
Brame, 446 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969); City of Creve Coeur v. Huddleston, 405
S.W.2d 536 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966); Witt v. City of Webster Groves, 398 S.W.2d 16 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1965). But see Town and Country, 657 S.W.2d at 611 n.3 ("These cases do not
signal an abandonment of the requirement in the Graeler decisions to consider the inter-
est of the county as a community").
105. See Brief, St. Louis County, supra note 104, at 9, 11. "There has been no
cogent showing that there has been a material change in governmental structures or in
the competing interest of a highly urbanized county which provides comprehensive,
municipal type services." Id.
106. Id. at 14. The county recognized that its interest is only one factor the courts
should consider in evaluating the reasonableness of an annexation, but argued that "the
'county interest' principle enunciated in Graeler I should be neither eliminated nor
modified. Rather annexations should turn, as they have always turned, on their mer-
its." Id.
107. The Missouri Supreme Court split four to three. Justice Higgins, joined by
Justices Blackmar, Donnelly and Lowenstein (special judge) wrote the majority opin-
ion. Justice Gunn, joined by Chief Justice Rendlen and Justice Billings, dissented. Jus-
tice Welliver did not take part in the decision.
108. See 657 S.W.2d at 606. The supreme court indicated that the legislative
changes in the annexation scheme modified judicial concern for the county govern-
ments' interest in annexation. Id. The Town and Country court limited its review to
determining whether substantial evidence supported the reasonableness and necessity of
a city's decision to annex. Id. at 605. The court added that if there is substantial evi-
dence that an annexation is reasonable and necessary, then the issue is at least debatable
and the court will therefore uphold the city's action. Id. See also supra notes 30-32 and
accompanying text (discussing the fairly debatable standard in Missouri annexation
cases).
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Graeler I and II.'" First, the court indicated that the legislature's ac-
tions modified the judiciary's role in evaluating the reasonableness of a
proposed annexation. 1 At the time the supreme court decided the
Graeler cases, residents of unincorporated areas had no voice in the
annexation process."' The judiciary had to safeguard the interests of
residents in unincorporated areas by reviewing the effect of a proposed
annexation on the unincorporated community." 2 After Graeler, how-
ever, the legislature established the dual election requirement, 1 3 which
gave residents in areas targeted for annexation the opportunity to vote
in favor of or in opposition to a proposed annexation.' 14 The court
noted that the legislature had modified the judiciary's burden in that
residents directly affected by an annexation could now represent their
own interests in an election." 5 Second, the court determined that the
right to vote gave residents affected by an annexation the opportunity
to consider the interests of St. Louis County as a community." 6 Par-
ticipation in the political process permitted residents in unincorporated
areas to consider issues affecting them as residents of St. Louis
County. 1 7  The court concluded that the residents of the annexing
municipality and the unincorporated area must determine at the ballot
box the interests of all parties." 8 Noting that judicial consideration of
109. See 657 S.W.2d at 605. See also supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
110. Id.
111. Id. See supra note 51.
112. 657 S.W.2d at 605. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
113. 657 S.W.2d at 605. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
114. 657 S.W.2d at 605. The Town and Country court noted that since Graeler,
"the legislature has acted to give affected residents a determinative voice in the annexa-
tion process." Id.
115. Id. "Absent approval by the voters in both the unincorporated area(s) and the
annexing municipality, the municipality cannot perfect its proposed annexation. And
because the residents who are directly affected by an annexation exercise such control,
the burden of the judiciary has been modified." Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. These issues included: the need for municipal services in the parcels sought
to be annexed; whether the county adequately met their present needs; whether the
county's services should be supplanted by city services; and whether the proposed an-
nexation would impair or improve the county's interests. Id. The court indicated that
voters "had to weigh the impact of the annexation on the totality of circumstances and
consequences inherent in the choice of governmental auspices." Id. The court did not
identify the specific interests of the county that voters should consider when voting on a
proposed annexation.
118. Id. The court determined that pertinent statutes enacted since the Graeler
cases require the residents of affected areas to make any efforts for or against annexa-
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the county's interest was no longer necessary,119 the court held that
Town and Country's annexations were reasonable under the Sawyer
Act. 120
A strong dissent by Justice Gunn urged the court not to abandon the
precedents established in the Graeler cases. The dissent believed that
the legislature's separate election amendments did not affect the princi-
ples of the Graeler cases.' 2 1 The dissent argued that the need for the
judiciary to consider the county's interests was more acute now than
when the court decided the Graeler cases. 122 The dissent emphasized
the Graeler court's distinction between annexations in urban and rural
counties"2' because the services provided by St. Louis County to unin-
tion. Id. at 605-06. The majority perhaps believed that the county should wage a polit-
ical campaign to protect its interests prior to an annexation election. This proposition,
however, presents several problems. First, it pits the county against the city in a bid-
ding war for governmental services, which may not be within the best interests of resi-
dents living in other unincorporated areas that cannot vote in the annexation election.
Second, it forces governmental entities to find ways to finance a campaign in favor of or
against an annexation referendum, potentially skirting the limitation on the use of pub-
lic funds for a questionable public purpose. See also infra notes 159-62 and accompany-
ing text.
119. The court found that Missouri's annexation statutes do not explicitly address
the interests of the county government "vis-a-vis" other governmental entities in annex-
ation cases. 657 S.W.2d at 606. The county's interests "are now permitted to be consid-
ered in the first instance by residents of affected areas as part of the totality of
circumstances and consequences [surrounding a proposed annexation]." Id. The court
further supported its view by finding "that St. Louis County and municipalities located
therein are not competing governmental entities ... they are coexisting governmental
entities... [that] serve the general interests of these residents, not to engage in competi-
tion for the right to collect revenues, provide services and the like." Id.
120. Id. at 608. The supreme court concluded that "[tihe trial court properly as-
sessed the evidence submitted and concluded that the reasonableness of the annexations
was fairly debatable. Insofar as the Graeler cases are inconsistent with the standard of
review as enunciated in subsequent cases ... they are overruled." Id.
121. See id. at 609 (Gunn, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 612 (Gunn, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that annexation cases in St.
Louis County involved unique circumstances. "Specifically, the City of Town and
Country is substantially less sophisticated in development and as a provisioner of mu-
nicipal services than the unincorporated area of St. Louis County which it seeks to bring
into the fold of its limits and limited services." Id. at 610 (Gunn, J., dissenting).
123. See id. at 610-11. Justice Gunn argued that the courts must treat annexations
in highly urbanized St. Louis County differently than it considers annexations in less
developed areas. Quoting from City of St. Peters v. Kodner Dev. Corp., 525 S.W.2d 97,
99 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) and the Graeler decisions, Justice Gunn reasoned that some of
the distinctions found in urban areas buttress the county's interest in annexation cases.
People generally do not associate themselves with the particular municipality they live
in, rather they regard themselves as part of the larger metropolitan area. Id. at 611.
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corporated areas had become more sophisticated and highly devel-
oped.124 Recognizing the vitality of Graeler's "county as a community
concept," Justice Gunn argued that the court must consider St. Louis
County's interest and weigh them against the claims of the city. 125 In
the dissent's view, Town and Country sought the unincorporated terri-
tory to increase its tax revenues and gain a stronger position against
further commercial development near its borders. 126 The county lost
substantial tax revenues, planning and control over valuable property
designated for commercial development. 127 Balancing these competing
interests, the dissent concluded that the evidence failed to support a
fairly debatable showing that the annexations were reasonable and
necessary. '
21
The Town and Country decision marked a significant departure from
Proximity and access to the metropolitan job market are primary considerations. See
id. Thus, certain standards established by prior cases to determine the reasonableness of
an annexation in rural areas provide minimal guidance to courts reviewing annexations
in urban or suburban areas. See id.
124. Id. at 612.
125. Id. Unlike his predecessors in the Graeler I, II and Champ decisions, Justice
Gunn specifically identified St. Louis County's interests in the annexation proposed by
the City of Town and Country. The county would lose substantial tax revenues and
control of planning and development of the unincorporated area. Id. at 612-13.
126. Id. at 613. Evidence reviewed by the dissent showed that by annexing unincor-
porated lands, the city would derive an additional $77,500 to $115,000 a year in taxes.
Id. After the city, through its Board of Aldermen, decided to annex the adjacent areas,
the city explained its decision to the voters in an open letter to Town and Country
residents. The letter explained that through annexation, Town and Country would:
"l) Gain a sizeable commercial tax base and a growing residential tax base; 2) Achieve
vital zoning protection on its borders; 3) Insure the survival of Town and Country be-
yond the mid 1980s; 4) Reduce real estate taxes; 5) Avoid imposition of nondeductible
taxes." Id. See also Reply Brief for Appellee St. Louis County at 8-9, City of Town and
Country v. St. Louis County No. 42324 slip op. (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) ("the express,
improper reason for the proposed annexations-the development of a commercial tax
base at a distance from the present boundaries of Town and Country, gerrymandered,
irregular boundaries ... would keep out of the proposed enlarged municipality-half-
acre residences, planned environmental units, condominiums, and apartments which
were thought to detract from Town and Country's luxury life-style") [hereinafter cited
as Reply Brief, St. Louis County]. Id.
127. 657 S.W.2d at 612. St. Louis County claimed that its aggregate loss of tax
revenues from the Town and Country annexations would begin at one million dollars
and impact most heavily upon the county Departments of Parks and Recreation, High-
ways and Traffic, and Police. Id. In addition, Town and Country would get a windfall
prdfit from sales tax revenues. See Reply Brief, St. Louis County, supra note 126, at 18-
19.
128. 657 S.W.2d at 613.
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the Missouri Supreme Court's previous view of annexations in urban
counties and set the stage for major changes in St. Louis County's an-
nexation scheme. Although the long-term effects of the Town and
Country decision are for now unclear, some attempt can be made to
assess the case's impact on St. Louis County and its municipalities, and
explore the deficiencies of the annexation process as it now stands.
III. THE MISSOURI ANNEXATION SCHEME: IMPACT
AND DEFICIENCIES
A. Impact
The Town and Country decision permitted municipalities in St.
Louis County to pursue new annexations of unincorporated territory.
By eliminating the review of the county's interest in annexation ac-
tions, the Missouri Supreme Court removed an obstacle that had inhib-
ited annexations for more than twenty years. 129 In removing this
barrier, however, the court has also sharpened the conflict between mu-
nicipalities, the county and the unincorporated areas targeted for
annexation.'
30
Aggressive competition for the rich commercial real estate lying in
St. Louis County's unincorporated areas underlies this conflict.' 31 Be-
cause the county relies on tax revenues from commercial and industrial
developments in unincorporated areas to pay for the services and bene-
fits it provides, municipal annexation could erode the county's financial
base and undermine its ability to govern effectively. 132 In the wake of
the Town and Country decision, municipalities can now eye annexa-
129. Wendel, Annexations: Problems and Prospects, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Feb.
27, 1984 at A17, col. 2. [hereinafter cited as Wendel, Post-Dispatch]. The remarks by
the mayor of Overland, made after the Town and Country decision, are indicative of the
attitudes harbored by several municipalities in St. Louis County. The Town and Coun-
try case has "opened the doors," spurring Overland to revive its dormant annexation
plans. See St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Sept. 29, 1983, at NI, col. 4.
130. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
131. See St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Sept. 25, 1983, at BI, col. 5; St. Louis Post-Dis-
patch Oct. 17, 1983, at A18, col. 2.
132. See St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Sept. 30, 1983, at A14, col. 2. Gradually, annexa-
tions could force the county to surrender the attractive part of its tax base, leaving it
with inadequate resources to deliver services and provide effective government. Id. See
also supra note 62 and accompanying text. St. Louis County Executive Gene McNary
remarked that the Town and Country decision permits a municipality to look along its
boundaries and annex a nearby commercial establishment merely to increase its tax
revenue. Id.
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tions of highly developed unincorporated areas as a new revenue source
that potentially could reduce residential property taxes and maintain or
improve the city's financial stability. 3 ' Many municipalities have an-
nounced plans either to annex unincorporated territory, find such terri-
tory to annex or revive previous annexation proposals. 134
Prospectively, these annexations could reduce significantly the county
government's tax revenues, 135 and force more than half of the county's
municipalities to raise property taxes.13 6
In 1984 the Missouri Legislature attempted to discourage this wave
of proposed annexations by modifying the county sales tax distribution
system and thereby reducing the tax benefits created by annexing unin-
corporated areas. 137 The county sales tax is a major source of revenue
that is often at the base of the annexation conflict. The state collects
133. See id. Following the Town and Country decision the mayor of the city prom-
ised to reduce the property tax by using the sales revenue gained by annexation. Post-
Dispatch, Sept. 25, supra note 131.
134. See St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Sept. 29, 1983, at NI, col. 4 (Overland aldermen
revive dormant annexation plans and vote to proceed with plans to annex 4200 acres of
commercial, industrial and residential land); St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Oct. 5, 1983, at
AI, col. 2 (Creve Coeur plans to annex industrial and retail entertainment complex); St.
Louis Post-Dispatch, Oct. 11, 1983, at Al, col. 1 (Olivette and Bridgeton propose an-
nexation of commercial or industrial areas); St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Oct. 13, 1983, at
NI, col. 1 (Fenton forms annexation committee; Florissant moves annexation up on
agenda for new general plan); St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Oct. 26, 1983, at A3, col. 2
(Village of Twin Oaks formulates plans to annex residential and commercial land); St.
Louis Post-Dispatch, Oct. 27, 1983, at Al, col. 4 (Black Jack proposes annexation to
triple city size, including shopping center with 87 retail stores); St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
Nov. 8, 1983, at A3, col. 2 (Valley Park proposes study of annexation for business
expansion); St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Nov. 10, 1983, at N3, col. 2 (Webster Groves
moves to annex commercial property in south St. Louis County).
135. See St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Oct. 16, 1983, at BI, col. 4. The St. Louis County
Planning Department estimated it would lose $2.5 million from Creve Coeur's proposed
annexations alone. Id.
136. Id. There are currently 90 municipalities in St. Louis County. St. Louis
County estimated that just three of the many proposed annexations would cause 50
municipalities that share in a sales tax pool to raise property taxes by an average of 22.6
cents for every $100 of assessed valuation. Some municipalities that do not have a prop-
erty tax would have-to impose one. St. Louis County based these figures on the effect of
Eureka's annexation of the Six Flags entertainment park and other annexations by
Town and Country and Creve Coeur. See St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Oct. 16, 1983, at BI,
col. 4.
137. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 66.610-.620 (Supp. 1984); Post-Dispatch, Oct. 13,
1983, supra note 134. The state collects a one percent sales tax from incorporated and
unincorporated parts of the county. Id. The legislature also amended the annexation
statute by imposing an additional procedural requirement on municipalities annexing
unincorporated areas in St. Louis County. The legislature suspended the effective date
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this tax and then distributes it to the county, and the municipalities
within the county, to help finance local government operations and to
provide needed services. t3 Under the present system there are two
methods of distributing sales tax revenue in St. Louis County. Munici-
palities may either elect to keep the sales tax revenues generated within
their boundaries, or participate in a tax pool in which the revenues are
divided between pool municipalities and the county based on popula-
tion. '39 Municipalities electing to keep the sales tax revenues can gain
additional revenues by annexing unincorporated areas with lucrative
tax sources."4 Pool municipalities and the county, however, must then
share a smaller portion of funds collected from the county's remaining
commercial areas. t4 '
Under the legislature's modified scheme, a municipality which an-
nexes an unincorporated area that participates in the sales tax pool re-
ceives part of the sales tax revenue generated in the annexed area. The
annexed unincorporated area remains part of the pool for the purpose
of future allocations of county sales tax revenue.' 42 After the effective
date of an annexation, the annexing city receives only a portion of the
sales tax revenue generated in the annexed unincorporated area, based
upon the ratio of the unincorporated area's population to the total pop-
of any annexation in St. Louis County for one year after approval by the voters. See
Mo. REV. STAT. § 71.870 (Supp. 1984). The provision provides that:
[N]o annexation in a first-class charter county which has a population of at least
nine hundred thousand shall become effective sooner than one year after the vote for
annexation if the question of annexation is carried by a majority of the votes cast
by the two groups of voters.
Id. (emphasis added).
138. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 66.620-.622 (Supp. 1984). See also Wendel, Post-Dis-
patch, supra note 129. Under the present tax distribution system, revenues are divided
between the county and the 51 cities that participate in the tax pool, and 39 cities,
commonly called point-of-sale cities, that keep sales revenues generated within their
borders. The distribution formula for the county and its pool cities is based on popula-
tion. In 1982 pool governments shared S30.7 million, including $19 million that went
to unincorporated areas of St. Louis County. Post-Dispatch, Oct. 16, supra note 135.
139. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 66.620-.622 (Supp. 1984).
140. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text. See also St. Louis Post-Dis-
patch, Sept. 25, supra note 131 (Town and Country's annexation will bring the city two
million dollars in sales tax revenues currently shared by the county and other munici-
palities); St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Oct. 6, 1983, at A14, col. 2 (Creve Coeur is point-of-
sale city; annexation called a "tax grab").
141. See Wendel, Post-Dispatch supra note 129. See also Post-Dispatch, Oct. 17,
supra note 131 (annexations could leave county with unincorporated areas that produce
little income but are expensive to serve).
142. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 66.620-.622 (Supp. 1984).
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ulation of pool municipalities, including residents in the county's unin-
corporated areas. 143 By basing the allocation formula on population,
the legislature sought to discourage a municipality from annexing an
unincorporated area primarily for tax revenues. Through this distribu-
tion scheme, unincorporated areas that produce substantial sales tax
revenue, but are sparsely populated, become less desirable targets for
municipal annexations. In theory, the restructured tax allocation sys-
tem will provide annexing municipalities only with the proportion of
additional revenues necessary to provide municipal services to residen-
tial households in the annexed areas, thus protecting the revenues
needed by the county and municipalities that participate in the tax
pool.
While the legislative changes in the sales tax distribution system may
achieve the limited goal of reducing the number of annexations moti-
vated solely by tax revenues, the changes are unlikely to stop the com-
petition between municipalities for unincorporated, commercially
developed territory.'" Municipalities seeking tax revenues from major
commercial centers or industrial facilities lying in unincorporated areas
simply can include a larger residential population in their proposed an-
nexations, thus decreasing the revenues allocated to the county and its
pool municipalities. 45 Faced with diminished tax revenues, the county
and many municipalities without tax rich areas to annex will have to
find other funding sources to replace those lost through annexations.
Inevitably, these governmental entities will have to impose additional
tax burdens on their residents or deprive their communities of essential
government services. 46
143. Id. The statutory section provides:
After the effective date of the annexation, the annexing city, town or village shall
receive a percentage of the Group B distributable revenue equal to the percentage
ratio that the population of the annexed area bears to the total population of Group
B and such annexed area shall not be classified as unincorporated area for determi-
nation of the percentage allocable to the county.
Id.
144. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
145. Extending municipal services to a greater number of residents in unincorpo-
rated areas may improve the cost effectiveness of providing such services. In other
words, the proportionate share of sales tax revenue may exceed the additional cost of
providing services to the additional households, thus netting the annexing municipality
tax revenue from its annexation.
146. See St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Nov. 7, 1983, at A14, col. 2. "A few well-to-do
communities [will] enjoy the lion's share of the sales tax while the other communities
and the county government would find themselves hard-pressed to pay for routine serv-
ices." Id. See also supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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In sum, the legislature's response to the wave of annexations in St.
Louis County following the Town and Country decision is inadequate.
By restructuring the county sales tax scheme the legislature avoided
the fundamental problems underlying the annexation conflict: the in-
equities between wealthy municipalities, poor municipalities, the
county government, and residents in unincorporated areas;1 47 the
"whittling away" of county government; 148 and recognition of the ur-
ban county as a community in annexation disputes.' 49
B. Problems Posed by the Present Annexation Scheme
Missouri's annexation law is currently inadequate to meet the needs
of its metropolitan communities. By abandoning Graeler I and II's
concept of the urban county as a community, 5 0 the Missouri Supreme
Court failed to recognize the central role the urban county government
plays in providing community services, promoting orderly growth
through regional planning and zoning and representing the interests of
a metropolitan region.'
Moreover, the current annexation scheme ignores the interests of
nearly half a million residents that live in unincorporated areas of St.
147. See Post-Dispatch, Oct. 17, supra note 131 (present arrangement threatens eq-
uitable access to the tax base). Prior to the changes in the county sales tax distribution
scheme, Professor Wendel noted that haphazard annexation of unincorporated areas
with lucrative tax sources, which left the largest urban population in the state with a
much-diminished tax base, portends an unpleasant future for St. Louis County. Some
municipalities would become richer, and additional rich municipalities would be cre-
ated. Wendel, Post-Dispatch, supra note 129.
148. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 43-46, 54 and accompanying text.
150. See id.
151. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. See also Note, The Urban County, A
Study of New Approaches to Local Government in Metropolitan Areas, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 526, 527 (1960). The commentator notes that the county government is the "ap-
propriate repository for increasing demands in metropolitan areas." Id. The benefits of
county government are roughly coextensive with the needs of the metropolitan commu-
nity. 1) Resources are utilized more effectively if placed at the disposal of the govern-
mental unit having area-wide responsibilities; 2) government efficiency and economy are
improved by eliminating duplicate operations in many jurisdictions; 3) county govern-
ment is coextensive with organic metropolitan problems and could improve planning
and capital improvements; and 4) well-developed ties between the state and county gov-
ernment can facilitate problem-solving. Id.; Selected Bureau Drafts, An Act to Establish
Standards and Procedures for Municipal Boundary Adjustment, 2 HARV. J. LEGIS. 239,
241-42 (1965) (noting annexation procedures fail to recognize that although geographic
and economic communities are divided into several government entities, their problems
are interconnected and the areas are interdependent).
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Louis County.1 52 Annexations affect not only residents in the annexing
municipality and residents in the proposed annexation area, but they
also affect residents in unincorporated areas not targeted for annexa-
tion. Because the court refused to consider the county's interest in as-
sessing the reasonableness of annexation proposals, the county cannot
intervene in declaratory judgment proceedings.' 53 In effect the legisla-
ture has precluded residents in unincorporated areas, who could be se-
riously harmed by unreasonable annexations, from protecting their
interests via the judicial process.
Although annexing municipalities in urban counties must follow the
requirements of the Sawyer Act, 154 there is virtually no effective check
on the reasonableness of a city's annexation. Under the Act, judicial
review is very deferential to actions taken by local legislative units.' 55
The judiciary can consider only whether the evidence establishes that
the reasonableness of and necessity for an annexation is fairly debata-
ble. 5 6 While the city has the burden of proof, the burden is met easily
by presenting at least some evidence that the annexation has a reason-
able basis."' Because it is unlikely that the judiciary will substitute its
judgment for that of the local governing body, annexations will pro-
ceed with minimal judicial scrutiny. 5 8 Consequently, only annexing
municipalities and voters in the municipalities and areas sought to be
annexed will control the annexation process. These three entities will
152. See Wendel, Post-Dispatch, supra note 129. Approximately 975,000 residents
live in St. Louis County. Some 560,000 live in the county's municipalities in about 40%
of the county's 500 square miles. Between 1970-1980, the unincorporated portion of St.
Louis County experienced a 27% increase in population which now stands at about
413,000. Id.
153. See Sandalow, supra note 4, at 694. Sandalow identifies three distinct interests
that annexation directly affects: the municipality, the annexed territory and the larger
area from which the annexed territory is taken. See also Note, Annexation-Key to
Arizona's Regional and Local Planning Problems, 1972 L. & Soc. ORD. 645 (state tradi-
tionally recognizes the interests of the municipality, the inhabitants of the territory to be
annexed and the county).
154. See supra note 101. The attorney for St. Louis County remarked following the
Town and Country case, that it is "questionable whether the county could file suit
against an annexation or intervene in one brought by other parties." St. Louis Post-
Dispatch, Oct. 5, 1983, at Al, col. 2.
155. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 29-30, 119-21, 128 and accompanying text.
158. One commentator notes that "nearly all non-routine annexations involve
clearly debatable issues of wisdom and necessity." See Woodroof, supra note 2, at 750.
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Country,'6 6 rejected a challenge by the county, and by voters who re-
side in unincorporated areas of the county, to invalidate the voting
franchise system for annexation elections. 1
67
The county claimed that denying voters who reside outside the
targeted area the right to vote in annexation elections violates the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.'68 The district court,
in rejecting the county's claim, determined that Missouri's voting re-
strictions for annexation elections are valid so long as the restrictions
rest on a rational basis.' 69 The court held that a rational basis exists
166. 590 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Mo. 1984).
167. See id. at 733-34. See also supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text for an
explanation of Missouri's annexation election statute.
168. 590 F. Supp. at 734. St. Louis County argued that because the Town and
Country decision held that the court need not consider the county's interest as a whole
when determining the reasonableness of a proposed annexation, the annexation pro-
ceedings available in state court did not provide adequate protection for their interests.
Id. Furthermore, the county claimed, the state's annexation election law disen-
franchises residents of unincorporated areas and does not protect the substantial inter-
ests they have at stake in a proposed annexation. Id.
169. Id. at 737-38. The Eastern District Court of Missouri rejected the county's
contention that it review the annexation election law under the compelling state interest
standard. Id. at 736.
Annexation elections are special, or "single-shot" elections, held for the limited pur-
pose of changing municipal boundaries. Unlike voters in local elections that determine
government policy decisions, for example elections for local representatives or refer-
enda, the voters in annexation elections do not exercise the type of control over nonvot-
ing county residents necessary to meet the equal protection clause's one-man, one-vote
principle.
A long line of Supreme Court cases supports the district court's application of the
rational basis standard. In Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action, 430
U.S. 259 (1977), the Supreme Court held the one-man, one-vote principle applicable to
elections for legislative representatives is "of limited relevance ... in analyzing the
propriety of recognizing distinctive voter interests in a 'single shot' referendum." Id. at
266. The Supreme Court also established in Lockport, and in other cases, that the state
can grant or deny the franchise in special elections to those it determines have a suffi-
cient or insufficient stake in the outcome. The Court applies a rational relation test to
the voting scheme of an annexation statute so long as the scheme does not affect a
suspect classification or a fundamental interest. See Holt Civic Club v. City of Tusca-
loosa, 439 U.S. 60, 69 (1978) ("Bona fide residence alone, however, does not automati-
cally confer the right to vote in all matters, for at least in the context of special interest
elections, the State may constitutionally disenfranchise residents who lack the required
special interest in the subject matter of the election"); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake
Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973) (statute designating only landowners as
qualified to vote for special district's board of directors upheld). But cf. City of Phoenix
v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970) (statute granting franchise solely to taxpayers in
general obligation bond elections denied equal protection); Cipriano v. City of Houma,
395 U.S. 701 (1969) (statute granting franchise solely to property taxpayers in elections
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because the legislature properly could conclude that a proposed annex-
ation would most directly affect residents of the annexing municipality
and residents of the proposed annexation area.
170
The Town and Country decisions in state and federal court will frus-
trate any further attempts to reform the annexation scheme through
the judicial process. Because the state has unlimited power to control
the annexation process, 171 the legislature must assume the responsibil-
ity of initiating reforms.
C. Eliminating Judicial Review
The legislature must alter the judiciary's role in the annexation pro-
cess. Currently, state courts must grant a declaratory judgment ap-
proving an annexation before it can proceed.' 72 This is an inefficient
and ineffective method to ensure the reasonableness of municipal an-
nexations. Annexations produce conflicts that can lead to extensive
litigation, thereby clogging crowded court dockets. 173 Delays associ-
called to approve revenue bonds denied equal protection); Kramer v. Union Free School
Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (statute restricting right to vote in school district elections
unconstitutional). See generally Gelfand, The Burger Court and the New Federalism;
Preliminary Reflections on the Roles of Local Government Actors in the Political Dramas
of the 1980's, 21 B.C.L. REv. 763 (1980) (Pattern of broad judicial deference to state
and local government restrictions on the franchise); Hagman & Disco, One Man, One-
Vote as a Constitutional Imperative for Needed Reform of Incorporation and Boundary
Change Law, 2 URn. LAW. 459 (1970) (state and local statutes dealing with annexation
may be constitutionally suspect); Martin, The Requirement of Concurrent Majorities in
a Charter Referendum: The Supreme Court's Retreat from Voting Equity, 16 DuQ. L.
REV. 167 (1977-78) (reviewing Supreme Court decisions affecting local elections); Note,
The Right to Vote in Municipal Annexations, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1571 (1975) (overview
and analysis of constitutionality of limiting franchise in annexation elections).
170. 590 F. Supp. at 738-39.
171. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907) (establishing the general
principle that municipal corporations are subdivisions of the state). Hunter held that
states had plenary power to control, modify or withdraw all powers conferred upon
municipalities. Id. at 178. For a more recent enunciation of the Hunter principles, see
Rogers v. City of Denver, 161 Colo. 72, 419 P.2d 648 (1966) (en banc); State ex rel.
Bowen v. Kruegal, 67 Wash. 2d 673, 409 P.2d 458 (1965) (en banc). Hunter has been
limited when applied to annexation issues touching upon racial discrimination. See,
e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (state plenary power does not extend
to racially discriminatory deannexation); cf Citizens Comm. to Oppose Annexation v.
City of Lynchburg, 400 F. Supp. 68 (W.D. Va. 1975), modified on other grounds, 528
F.2d 816 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1043 (1976) (Hunter still valid despite
some exceptions).
172. See supra notes 15, 68 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text. See also Annexation and Other
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ated with annexation proceedings also contribute to inefficient planning
and budgeting. 74
Additionally, judicial review is an ineffective method of preventing
bad annexation proposals. Frequently judges do not have sufficient ex-
pertise to evaluate the standards applicable to a particular annexa-
tion. 175  Furthermore, because declaratory judgment proceedings
exclude contemplation of county interests and courts refuse to consider
how an annexation may affect residents throughout the metropolitan
community, judicial oversight does little to ensure that annexations
will promote orderly growth and protect the interests of all urban
county residents.'
76
By removing the courts from the early stages of the annexation pro-
cess, the legislature will accomplish three important goals. First, the
legislature can improve judicial economy. Second, it can eliminate the
concern that the judiciary will exceed its scope of review and unneces-
sarily interfere with actions taken by local governmental units. Finally,
it can reduce the likelihood of unreasonable annexations.
1 77
D. Establishing An Independent State Board
After abolishing the judiciary's role in annexations, the legislature
should create an independent agency at the state level, called the state
annexation review board, to review annexation proposals.1 7 8 In effect,
the agency's board of commissioners would replace the judiciary in de-
termining whether an annexation is reasonable and necessary. Like the
present annexation scheme, an annexation would proceed after the mu-
nicipality passes a resolution declaring its intention to annex adjacent
territory. Following approval by the local governing body, the city
Municipal Boundary Changes (Survey of Developments in Virginia Law 1978-1979), 66
VA. L. REV. 329, 330 (1980) (annexation litigation is protracted and expensive).
174. See Mandelker, Municipal Incorporation and Annexation: Recent Legislative
Trends, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 285 (1960). As early as 1960, Professor Mandelker recognized
the link between lengthy annexation proceedings and inefficient planning.
175. See Note, supra note 153, at 659.
176. See supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
177. See Woodroof, supra note 2, at 771.
178. See generally Note, supra note 153 (advocating community development coun-
cil at the state level); Note, Municipal Annexation in Ohio, 14 AKRON L. REV. 661
(1981) (reviewing states' annexation statute and favoring greater administrative discre-
tion); Selected Bureau Drafts, supra note 151, at 242-65 (advocating and discussing
proposal to establish municipal boundaries and supervise municipal annexation through
State Board of Adjustment).
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would submit the annexation proposal to the state review board. The
board would schedule public hearings to give all interested parties the
opportunity to participate in the decision-making process. Witnesses
could include representatives of the annexing city and the county in
which the city is located, regional planners and other development ex-
perts, representatives of other municipalities within the county, and
residents and property owners of the unincorporated territory. After
reviewing the facts involved in a particular annexation and considering
the views of the hearing participants, the agency would determine if the
annexation should proceed.
To ensure that a proposed annexation is reasonable, the legislature
should provide the state review board with general standards and spe-
cific criteria to apply when reviewing annexation proposals. 179 In addi-
tion to the interests of both the annexing municipality and the area
proposed for annexation, these guidelines should consider the effects of
the annexation on the county government and its role in the county,
regional planning and orderly growth, consistent zoning, the efficient
delivery of local services and the tax structure.'80 If the board ap-
proves an annexation after considering these factors, the annexing mu-
nicipality and the unincorporated territory targeted for annexation
should conduct elections at which the voters could voice their opinions
on the proposed annexation.'"' If the review board rejects an annexa-
tion proposal, the proponents of the annexation should have the right
to challenge the agency's decision in court. The legislature, however,
should limit judicial review to determining whether the agency abused
its discretion in applying the statutory annexation standards to the evi-
dence in the record. Court action should be the only means available
to proponents to challenge an unfavorable board decision. Therefore,
no annexation proposals should appear on the ballot until the board
has approved them.
E. Advantages of the State Review Board
The independent agency alternative has several advantages over the
current annexation scheme.'8 2 First, it will inject greater expertise into
an increasingly complex decision-making process. Drawing on the ad-
179. See Woodroof, supra note 2, at 753-54; Selected Bureau Drafts, supra note
151, at 261-65.
180. See supra notes 63 and 151 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
182. See Woodroof, supra note 2, at 775; Note, supra note 151, at 656-61.
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determine if an annexation is reasonable and in the best interest of the
municipality, the unincorporated area, the county and the state.
Contrary to the Missouri Supreme Court's belief in Town and Coun-
try, leaving annexation decisions to the elected officials of the annexing
city and the voters of the annexing city and the unincorporated terri-
tory targeted for annexation does not ensure that an annexation will be
reasonable or in the best interests of the county, the state and the pub-
lic. '59 The political process as presently structured by the legislature
precludes some voters who have interests at stake in a proposed annex-
ation from protecting those interests at the ballot box. County resi-
dents who do not reside in the annexing municipality nor in the
unincorporated area sought to be annexed cannot vote in an annexa-
tion election.' "
Voters authorized by the legislature to participate in an annexation
election will not always consider whether a proposed annexation is rea-
sonable to county residents as a whole.' 61 Instead, voters will consider
whether a proposed annexation is in their own best interest and in the
interest of their particular community. 62  By limiting the voting
franchise in annexation elections, the legislature has precluded any
consideration of the detrimental effects an annexation may have on the
county's interest as a community or on the special needs of a metropol-
159. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. See also Note, supra note 153,
at 647-48. (most courts are ill-equipped to analyze the complex interrelationships in-
volved in annexations); Woodroof, supra note 2, at 744 (limited judicial review of mini-
mal value except to prevent annexation through fraud).
160. Several commentators have critized legislative schemes that base annexation
decisions on the outcome of popular elections. Critics have concluded that most voters
do not have the technical training neessary to consider properly all important factors.
See, e.g., Comment, Annexation Elections and the Right to Vote, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
1093, 1104 (1973) ("[b]y resting the franchise with special interest groups, annexation
laws ... increase the likelihood that an unwise choise will be made"). Other critics
reject annexation elections because local prejudices and jealousies become the primary
factors controlling the extension of municipal boundaries. See, e.g., Selected Bureau
Drafts, supra note 151, at 242-43 (overall community needs require sacrifice of local
goals to achieve greatest social utility in the area). One commentator notes that plan-
ning and rational urban growth are virtually impossible when the residents of the pro-
posed annexation area become the final judges through annexation elections. See Note,
supra note 153, at 648.
161. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
162. For example, the impact an annexation will have on property taxes will be of
greater concern to voters than the annexation's effect on county services. Cf. notes Ill-
12 and accompanying text (discussing court's prior role in protecting interests of resi-
dents in unincorporated areas).
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itan region. Thus, the electoral process is an ineffective means to pre-
vent unreasonable annexations.
IV. REFORMING THE ANNEXATION PROCESS: ALTERNATIVES FOR
MISSOURI AND ITS URBAN COUNTIES
A. The Goals of Reform
Annexations in urban counties affect an entire region, not merely the
particular interests of a municipality and the unincorporated area it
seeks to annex.' 63 Because the current annexation process does not
consider the reasonableness of annexations on a regional basis, 164 states
must develop a new process. The new process must protect the
broader public interests of the metropolitan area with annexations that
will encourage orderly growth, maintain an equitable tax structure, re-
sult from coordinated planning efforts, continue the efficient delivery of
local services and reduce intergovernmental conflicts.
B. The Path of Reform
Restructuring the annexation scheme will require action by the state
legislature. Recent decisions demonstrate that the state and federal
courts will not act to reform the annexation process. At the state level,
the Town and Country decision clearly holds that the judiciary need
not consider the unique needs of urban county residents when evaluat-
ing the reasonableness of an annexation.' 65 At the federal level, the
Eastern District of Missouri, in St. Louis County v. City of Town and
163. See supra note 160. See also NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MUNICIPAL LAW OF-
FICERS, 42A MUN. L. REV. 22, 23 (1979) ("citizens of an area to be annexed will often
vote self-interest when it comes to annexation ... to avoid municipal taxation and
impede the necessary and intelligent growth of municipalities") [hereinafter cited as
NIMLO].
164. See supra note 152. See generally St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Sept. 30, 1983, at
A14, col. 2 (Town and Country sacrificed the broad interest of the county for the nar-
row interests of a few people). One commentator found annexation laws fail to recog-
nize the interdependence of communities in an urban area:
People often regard local governments as entities, an attitude which is based on a
tendency to view local boundaries as we do national boundaries, and to regard
them as somehow rooted in nature, and to think of the territories and populations
they enclose as somehow composing "really" distinct communities. This imagined
autonomy fails to account for the very real interdependence of communities in an
urban area.
Comment, supra note 160, at 1121.
165. See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
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vice of planning and development experts, agency members can evalu-
ate evidence carefully and make informed choices regarding the most
appropriate municipal boundaries. Furthermore, the agency will de-
velop additional expertise by repeatedly applying the legislature's stan-
dards and criteria to various annexation proposals. Consequently, a
state review board will settle disputes more efficiently and help reduce
litigation.
Second, reviewing annexation proposals at the state level will pro-
mote orderly growth. Agency board members will be removed from
the competition between municipalities and the local jealousies that
frustrate the planning process. Board members will evaluate annexa-
tion proposals by considering whether they are consistent with the
growth and development plans of the state and region, as well as the
proper development of the annexing municipality and the unincorpo-
rated area.
Third, adoption of this annexation process will balance the interests
of the state, its metropolitan communities, the interests of residents in
the annexing city and residents in the territory targeted for annexation.
The new process protects the broader interests of the state and its de-
veloping metropolitan areas by preventing unreasonable annexations.
Furthermore, by requiring elections after the agency approves a propo-
sal, the process retains local control over annexation decisions. 183 Vot-
ers in the annexing municipality and voters in the proposed annexation
area will make the final decision in the annexation process. Residents
in unincorporated areas can consider whether they want to become
part of an incorporated municipality, while residents in the annexing
city decide whether to increase the boundaries and size of their
community.
V. CONCLUSION
Missouri is typical of many states with developing metropolitan
communities facing growth, planning and financial problems. 184 An-
nexation is one important method of resolving these problems, but the
current annexation process is inadequate. The legislature must estab-
lish a new annexation plan that places annexation decisions at the state
level and diminishes the role of the judiciary. A new annexation
183. The state level agency proposal has been criticized because it removes the an-
nexation process from local control and eliminates local self-determination. See
NIMLO, supra note 163, at 23.
184. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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scheme will reduce local competition for unincorporated territory with
valuable commercial property and ease tensions between governmental
entities. By adopting an agency plan, the legislature will recognize that
communities in urban counties are interdependent. Annexations must
promote orderly growth not only in the cities and the unincorporated
areas involved, but also in the region where they are located. Finally, a
new annexation process will acknowledge the benefits provided by ur-
ban county government and safeguard the broader stake that residents
have in their metropolitan communities.
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